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Getting effective macroprudential policy  
on the road: eight propositions 
Dietrich Domanski and Tim Ng
1 
Introduction 
It is widely agreed that effective macroprudential policy needs to be part of the stabilisation 
policy arsenal. Macroprudential policy aims to limit systemic risk, primarily by regulating 
financial institutions. Its rationale is that individual financial firms can create negative 
externalities for other parts of the financial system and these externalities can threaten the 
stability of the financial system as a whole, even if individual firms appear sound.  
The challenge now is to translate these abstract imperatives into practical operational 
frameworks. In doing so, policymakers must judge which framework elements most need 
development. Much of the literature on macroprudential policy describes obstacles relating to 
analytical gaps, institutional limitations and political economy.
2 This paper’s contribution is to 
assess progress in overcoming the obstacles and to suggest priorities for development.  
The elements of any policy framework are an objective, diagnostic tools, instruments, an 
operating strategy, and governance arrangements. Many examples of these elements now 
exist.
3 Some observers see the macroprudential technology, especially the diagnostic tools 
and instruments, as lacking.
4 We instead suggest that it is not individual framework elements 
themselves, but their integration in a way that resonates with the public, which most needs 
attention. There should be an explicit macroprudential mandate, an operating strategy that 
includes leaning against the financial cycle, centralised and transparent decision-making, 
and simple communication of policy decisions linked clearly to systemic risk assessments.  
A coherent and easily understood integration – a core policy narrative – will be essential for 
building a durable political constituency for financial stability. Such a constituency will be 
especially important as memory of the crisis fades and as policy errors and misjudgments 
are inevitably made. Public understanding of the framework might also bolster its 
effectiveness by promoting stabilising expectations.  
In the rest of this paper we articulate this argument more precisely, in the form of eight 
propositions about the focus of the development work needed. We discuss the technology 
first and then move to institutional and communications matters.  
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Eight propositions about effective macroprudential policy  
Proposition 1: Existing indicators can support effective systemic risk diagnosis.  
A substantial body of research studies the evolution of systemic risk factors, measured at a 
fairly aggregated level, over time. Newer research links systemic risk to more disaggregated 
factors such as common exposures and financial system interlinkages.
5 In either case, 
policymakers need to know how reliably the indicators can predict financial crises or major 
output fluctuations. At the aggregate level the evidence is better established. Above-trend 
aggregate credit and asset prices, for example, can predict crises reasonably well.
6 
For diagnostic purposes it helps that the many systemic risk indicators seem mostly to be 
positively correlated. This correlation suggests that there is an underlying “financial cycle”, or 
ebbing and flowing of general risk sentiment. Figure 1 illustrates with a financial cycle 
indicator for the United States, constructed as the first principal component (PC) of a diverse 
range of variables variously cited as measures of risk-seeking.
7 This PC has a correlation 
coefficient of 0.7 or 0.8 with most of the underlying indicators and explains around half their 
total variance, suggesting that it is indeed picking up a generalised financial cycle.  
The concept of the financial cycle is similar to “financial conditions” examined in other 
empirical work,
8 with the key difference that our indicator excludes variables that would be 
heavily influenced by monetary policy. Financial conditions indices summarise all influences 
on the general cost and availability of funding, whereas the financial cycle measure is 
intended to extract the contribution to systemic risk of the private financial sector.  
Figure 1 
A composite financial cycle indicator for the US 














Source: authors’ calculations. 
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Proposition 2: Suitable and familiar instruments exist and should be used.  
Many instruments suitable for macroprudential use are available and familiar from traditional 
microprudential policy. Hard limits can be imposed on the risk associated with specific 
activities, such as loan-to-value (LTV) or debt service ratios, currency mismatches or sectoral 
credit concentrations. Or, risk-taking by financial institutions can be influenced more 
generally through capital or liquidity requirements.  
There are many instances of interventions of the specific sort, particularly in emerging 
economies. For example, several Asian economies have used LTV ratios for the past decade 
or so to protect their banking systems from property market downturns.
9  
The Basel III capital framework includes as macroprudential instruments a countercyclical 
capital buffer, higher loss absorbency for systemically important banks, and a leverage 
ratio.
10 New tools are also being developed in response to the problems associated with 
shadow banking and wholesale funding markets during the crisis.
11 While of course one 
should be open to the possibility of new and better tools in the future, building the toolkit now 
around readily available and familiar tools would limit the risks associated with novel 
instruments.  
Proposition 3: Policymakers should operate instruments to lean against the financial 
cycle as well as applying fixed limits to risk-taking. 
Policymakers can either leave the instrument settings mostly fixed over time, or actively 
adjust them to anticipate and counteract (that is, lean against) the financial cycle. Fixed 
settings are technically simpler, but they cannot guarantee that systemic risk will be 
acceptably constrained under all circumstances. Policymakers therefore need to monitor 
emerging developments and to be prepared to adjust the settings if necessary.  
Diagnostic efforts supporting a leaning strategy should focus on the risky behaviour during 
upswings, rather than waiting for signs of actual deterioration in financial strength. By the 
time these signs appear, it will probably be too late to act. Moreover, financial strength could 
well be overstated towards the end of upswings, due to procyclicality in mark-to-market 
accounting practices and optimistic risk modelling.  
Tightening when things seem to be going well will not be popular. And to be fair, genuine 
positive productivity shocks often underpin rising asset prices and credit early in the financial 
cycle. The diagnostic issue is identifying the point when risk-seeking rather than economic 
fundamentals become the main driver of the financial upswing. This point necessarily occurs 
before traditional indicators of balance sheet robustness start turning. 
Proposition 4: The macroprudential mandate should be explicit. 
Explicit mandates bolster policymakers’ legal and moral authority to take unpopular actions. 
They also clarify, even for regulatory staff themselves, who is doing what and why. Mandates 
help resolve principal/agent and communications problems if the macroprudential agency 
also takes microprudential or monetary policy decisions, if some officials are involved in 
decisions in more than one policy area, or if different policy functions use the same type of 
regulation (for example, capital requirements).  
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Jurisdictions across the world are increasingly issuing explicit and high-profile mandates for 
macroprudential policy. In the United States, United Kingdom and European Union, for 
example, these mandates have the force of statute. The US and UK examples appear most 
specific in pointing to “leaning” strategies. The US text includes a function “to respond to 
emerging threats to … [stability]”, while the UK highlights “damping the credit cycle”. The EU 
case is less specific in requiring the authority to “allow for risk assessments to be translated 
into action by the relevant authorities”.
12 
Independence of the macroprudential decision-making from the political process strengthens 
the moral force of mandates. The composition of the UK macroprudential committee appears 
to emphasise independence most strongly (Table 1). The Treasury is present, but non-
voting. The United States is at the other end of the scale, with the Treasury chairing the 
committee. The European Union is in the middle, with the European Commission supplying a 
voting member and the EU Economic and Financial Committee a non-voting member. 
 
Table 1 
Macroprudential authority membership and powers 





Chair: central bank/supervisor governor. Officials from: 
central bank/supervisor, consumer protection and 






Chair: central bank governor. Officials from: ECB and 
national central banks, European Supervisory Authorities, 
European Commission. Non-voting: EU ECOFIN 








Chair: Treasury Secretary. Officials from: central 
bank/supervisor, other supervisory agencies, consumer 
financial protection agency, markets supervisor, deposit 
insurer, commodities regulator, housing finance agency, 




Sources: HM Treasury (2010); Commission of the European Communities (2009); US Congress (2010). 
 
Proposition 5: Decision-making should be centralised, but draw on a broad range of 
information. 
Since macroprudential policy is system-focused, its decision-making should be centralised in 
an identifiable agency that has full control over the macroprudential instrument(s).
13 In cases 
where another authority also uses the same type of intervention, such as a capital 
requirement, the macroprudential agency should have full authority to apply its own 
requirement on top of that of the other agency. Such centralisation sends supervised firms 
clear and uniform messages, and simplifies international coordination.  
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Centralisation of decision-making does not imply centralisation of information-gathering. On 
the contrary, supervisory information and market intelligence about risk-taking or herding 
behaviour in the upswing could be key evidence supporting early action. The US, UK and EU 
approaches all involve a wide variety of financial agencies in decision-making, including at 
least the central bank, supervisors and securities regulators (see Table 1). However, the 
degree of centralisation of decision-making power varies significantly across the three cases. 
The UK committee can give directions regarding instrument settings, whereas the US and 
EU committees can issue comply-or-explain recommendations only. The comply-or-explain 
approach decentralises decision-making to the regulators receiving the recommendations, 
thus leaving open whether a recommended macroprudential intervention will be applied 
evenly across the financial system.  
Proposition 6: Policymakers need political support to tighten during upturns. 
Like any forward-looking policy, macroprudential policy must deal with noisy signals. Among 
other things, noisy signals create a bias against tightening during financial upswings. A 
partial solution is to link instrument settings to reliable risk indicators where available, to help 
create a presumption of policy action during the upswing. Few indicators, though, can be 
expected to send unambiguous signals early in the cycle.  
Moreover, noisy signals imply diagnostic errors and policy mistakes. Mistakes threaten the 
political acceptance and therefore also the durability of the macroprudential regime. The 
inevitability of mistakes and errors underlines the importance of dealing with political 
problems at source, by building a constituency for financial stability.  
Proposition 7: Macroprudential policy cannot eliminate the possibility of crises. 
The inevitability of policy mistakes also means that crises will happen again. This reinforces 
the need for the public to understand the rationale and limitations of macroprudential policy. 
It also means that three policy areas complementary to macroprudential policy will remain 
perennially relevant. First, the financial system infrastructure needs to be strong. Second, 
procyclicality due to accounting and microprudential policy standards needs to be reduced as 
much as possible. Third, tools to manage crisis and financial failure need to be effective.   
Proposition 8: Macroprudential communications should be simple. 
The technical and political economy challenges of macroprudential policy underline the 
essential role of effective communication. It is needed to counteract the bias against 
tightening during upswings and to build a long-lasting constituency for financial stability that 
understands the limits of policy. Influencing financial behaviour systemically also depends on 
simple policy communication. Well-informed public discourse could then strengthen the 
efficacy of policy by promoting the stabilisation of expectations and the legitimacy of the 
regime.
14  
However, getting the public discourse right will not be easy. The costs of intervention can be 
easily highlighted, but the benefits of limiting the risk of crises are much less tangible. The 
core policy narrative must therefore express the link from systemic risk diagnosis to 
instrument settings clearly and logically using straightforward concepts.  
Monetary policy communication offers a model. Its core policy narrative is that if aggregate 
demand runs ahead of aggregate supply, inflation will rise, and the central bank will hike the 
                                                  
14  See Haldane (2010) for an elaboration of this argument. 94  BIS Papers No 60
 
 
policy rate. This idea is widely understood as the way in which low and stable inflation is 
maintained. Monetary policy in practice is of course more complicated, but the narrative is 
nevertheless close enough for useful public dialogue about monetary policy to ensue.  
A core macroprudential policy narrative can be readily constructed around the analytical 
materials reviewed above. Ease and coherence of communication is another reason why we 
advocate building the young regime around a small number of fairly familiar risk concepts 
and instruments already in use.  
Communications about financial stability do currently exist, of course, but they need to be 
adapted to a world with policy instruments and mandates for action. They also need to be 
made more accessible. Even with their relatively narrow focus on the diagnosis part of the 
narrative, the typical contemporary financial stability communication could be simpler.  
As examples, we compared the financial stability and monetary policy press releases of three 
central banks recognised for their transparency of monetary policy: the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand (RBNZ), the Bank of England (BoE) and the Swedish Riksbank. Graph 2 shows, for 
the period 2005–10, the word count and Flesch Reading Ease index (FRE) for press 
releases accompanying official interest rate decisions and Financial Stability Report (FSR) 
disseminations. The FRE summarises how difficult a text is to read, penalising sentences 
with many words and words with many syllables, such that a lower FRE indicates greater 
reading difficulty.
15 The RBNZ seems to have the most work to do, with its financial stability 
releases noticeably longer and harder to read than its monetary policy releases.  
Graph 2 
Length and reading ease of monetary policy and  
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Source: authors’ calculations. 
The relative accessibility of central banks’ more specialist-oriented communications in each 
field is similarly contrasting. Inflation reports (IRs) tend to be shorter and to have an 
economically logical structure that essentially follows the lines of the core policy narrative. By 
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contrast, FSRs currently tend to be very long and dense, with many dozens of charts and 
tables, and, to our minds, with less of an obvious organising principle.
16  
Encouragingly, recent empirical work suggests that FSRs do influence financial conditions.
17 
Policymakers already spend considerable effort trying to use communications to influence 
risk-taking. And, thorough conjunctural documentation serves to show that the central bank’s 
policy decisions have involved careful deliberation. This contributes to stabilisation by 
promoting credibility and legitimacy and by providing expert opinion, which assists private-
sector decision-making. When the diagnostic material in current communications becomes 
clearly and expressly linked to current or likely future policy actions pursuant to explicit 
mandates, the communications might well become more effective.  
Conclusions 
This paper has surveyed a wide range of issues involved in getting practical macroprudential 
policy on the road with a reasonable chance of working. The technology available is not the 
biggest obstacle. Building a constituency for financial stability that understands the diagnostic 
difficulties and technical limits is both materially more urgent and essential to the durability of 
the framework as memory of the crisis fades.  
The policy problem needs to be simplified into a core narrative simple enough to engage the 
public. The core narrative can be readily constructed by emphasising the relatively familiar 
parts of the framework and linking diagnosis to action.  
Monetary policy communications offer a model. In that case, relatively simple 
communications have helped embed the policy regime and enabled expectations 
management to improve the effectiveness of the regime.  
To develop the core macroprudential policy narrative further, we suggest the following 
priorities.  
  The financial cycle should be defined and measured better, and modelled jointly with 
macroeconomic variables.  
  For now, instruments should be based on familiar tools such as capital and liquidity 
ratios and LTV limits.  
  A centralised authority should fully control the policy instruments under a clear 
mandate. 
  Communications need to be clarified, while avoiding the impression that the risk of 
crises can be eliminated. 
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